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Abstract
The effects of the novel coronavirus and its related disease COVID-19 have been far reaching, 
touching American society and its Western partners’ health and mortality, economics, social 
relationships, and politics. The effects have highlighted longstanding societal divisions, 
disproportionately harming minority groups and the socioeconomically disadvantaged with 
Black Americans and their communities hit especially hard. The problem being considered is 
the potential for Russian malign foreign influence to exploit the divides exacerbated by the 
coronavirus and target the United States and its European allies during the period leading to the 
2020 elections and beyond. Possible coronavirus effects are inventoried and categorized into 
economic, healthcare, and environmental issue areas that may be leveraged and weaponized. 
The article includes the scenarios of such weaponization, including the description of focal 
points that may be attacked. We conclude with a set of recommendations to counter malign 
foreign influence. 
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Introduction
In late-May 2020, the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and its related illness COVID-19, had 
resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 Americans and infected nearly 1.7 million. By mid-
October 2020, deaths had increased to over 210,000 and nearly 8,000,000 have been infected. 
Worldwide, in late-May over 350,000 had died and more than 3.7 million infected. The October 
numbers had reached 1 million deaths and over 37 million infected.1  The virus has depressed 
economic activity and unemployment claims have reached a level not seen since the Great 
Depression.2 Concurrently, COVID-19 has highlighted or exacerbated national divisions along 
many of society’s fault lines. Racial divides and socioeconomic inequalities have been emphasized 
alongside issues that include urban versus rural communities, resort towns and second-home 
owners, and essential workers and those working from home. Many aspects of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the response to it have been politicized with Republicans and Democrats divided on 
the national response, virus lethality, and even the efficacy of wearing a mask.3
This article was prepared in the spring of 2020 in advance of the period leading up to the 
November 2020 United States election and beyond. It was intended as a guide to potential 
Russian interference and its objectives. Recently, Russian social media postings have reportedly 
been detected containing misinformation intended to influence voting.4 In August 2020, the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis was 
removed from office.5 In a whistleblower complaint, the official alleged that beginning in May 
2020, he was instructed to suppress intelligence on Russian interference with the election 
process.6 This could mean that interference with the election has not been fully documented by 
one of the cabinet departments charged with detecting and reporting it.
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In April 2020, Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor 
in the Bush Administration, stated that the international community did not respond to 
COVID-19 crisis; instead individual countries responded on their own with no cooperation or 
coordination.7 Concurrently, competitive relationships also did not yield to cooperation against 
the virus. COVID-19 has widened the gap between the United States and its competitors. In the 
past, countries like Russia have exploited similar crisis, using them against the United States, 
including the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s.8 Iran and Russia state-sponsored media have 
pushed conspiracy theories about the United States and SARS-CoV-19 and has included criticism 
of the Trump Administration’s response.9 Both China and Russia have used the pandemic 
to further their own national goals including sending medical aid to Italy but the shipments 
seem to have been for geopolitical gain rather than for altruistic reasons.10 The problem 
being considered in this paper is how Russia might weaponize effects from COVID-19 against 
the United States and its Western partners during the period leading up to the November 
2020 presidential election as well as beyond in its longstanding campaign to undermine the 
legitimacy of democratic government.11 
This article is organized into several areas. It first examines historical Russian objectives with 
the West and the use of active measures against western populations and interests including 
disinformation campaigns. Then it examines how active measures and disinformation have been 
used against partners in Europe.  Next, we consider the use of influence operations and the 
interference with the 2016 U.S. elections and how they could be applied against the November 
2020 election and beyond.  Vulnerabilities to disinformation are considered and COVID-19 
outcomes are inventoried. We consider how they might be weaponized including scenarios that 
take advantage of racial and socioeconomic divides. As a caveat, an active measures campaign will 
likely utilize current issues that may add fuel to an already divisive situation. Narratives are not 
necessarily false but can be crafted to further Russian national goals. Finally, we outline scenarios 
that consider a wide range of COVID-19 effects, but an actual disinformation operation may only 
need to raise one or two issues to further inflame a tense or even violent situation.
Russian Objectives with the  
West and Active Measures
Russia has had a long-standing adversarial relationship with the United States and its Western 
partners. Following the Cold War, it perceived that the United States and the West took 
advantage of Russia and its weakness in the 1990s, expanding the western sphere of influence 
into Eastern Europe including Ukraine, a long-time part of the former Soviet Union.12 The fourth 
and fifth rounds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion brought former 
Warsaw Pact countries into the alliance and expanded the alliance to Russia’s western borders.13 
There is no reason to expect that COVID-19 will alter Russia’s behavior towards the United 
States and the West. Instead, we should expect continued attempts to undermine Western 
democratic legitimacy.
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Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, has had a long history of conflict with the United States 
and its allies and continuation should be expected. Vladimir Putin’s overarching goal is to 
subvert the United States and its Western allies.14 Putin has had a long-standing effort against 
the United States, its system of government, and institutions.15 Following the aggressive Russian 
actions in Ukraine, a new conflict has broken out with the United States. Additionally, Russia 
wants revenge for the economic sanctions imposed following the incursion into Ukraine and 
annexation of Crimea.16 With economic sanctions damaging its economy, Russia struck back by 
attacking the 2016 presidential elections.17
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated in 2013 that nonmilitary means of 
conflict have grown to exceed the effectiveness of military force in many cases.18  He proposed 
that asymmetric methods be used to undermine a target state’s legitimacy in the eyes of its 
population.19 The use of asymmetric methods or hybrid warfare techniques and procedures 
should be viewed as activities short of kinetic warfare along a spectrum of conflict.  These 
methods target both the population as well as attack the decision-making process of the 
target state.20 Hybrid warfare influence campaigns include propaganda, malinformation, and 
disinformation to influence the thoughts and beliefs of the target population.21 A defining 
element of hybrid warfare is targeting of the population alongside traditional political, 
economic, and information aspects of conflict.22 
Propaganda: Propaganda is true or false information spread to persuade an  
audience, but often has a political connotation and is often connected to  
information produced by governments. 
 
Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created or  
disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm. Producers of  
disinformation typically have political, financial, psychological, or  
social motivations. 
 
Misinformation is information that is false, but not intended to cause  
harm. For example, individuals who don’t know a piece of information is  
false may spread it on social media in an attempt to be helpful. 
 
Malinformation is genuine information that is shared to cause harm. This   
includes private or revealing information that is spread to harm a person  
or reputation.23 
Figure 1: Propaganda, Disinformation, Misinformation and Malinformation defined.
Russia will continue to use disinformation and malinformation campaigns against the West 
including against election processes.24 The purpose is to undermine the legitimacy of democratic 
government by aggravating societal divisions including race, political, ideological, and religious 
differences. Amplifying existing grievances and messaging may potentially manipulate the 
United States and other countries’ audiences.25 Russian disinformation does not necessarily 
seek to establish falsehoods but instead pollute discourse to lead populations to doubt the 
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truth and objective facts.26 This effort doesn’t necessarily pick a side in a disagreement but 
instead may support both sides in order to increase tensions. Occupy Wall Street co-founder 
Micah White reported that Russia co-opted the Occupy movement and will shift from actively 
supporting established social movements to directly instigating social protests themselves.27 
The Russian influence effort is part of the overall strategy of active measures, which seeks to 
use all of the tools available to undermine the United States while creating societal tensions 
and weakening democratic legitimacy.28 Russia has not limited these efforts to the Internet 
and social media and has increased its malinformation efforts through its state-controlled 
media like RT, the former Russia Today, in order to make audiences perceive that there is doubt 
about a particular event.29 These attacks are used to change the perception of a situation by 
an individual, group, or population in order to reframe thinking or create dissension. In 2014, 
Russia used a disinformation and malinformation campaign to legitimize its annexation of 
Crimea, casting itself as a defender against Ukrainian aggression against the resident Russian 
speaking population.30 
Russia uses disinformation and malinformation through a variety of venues including social 
media, state-controlled news, pseudo-science, and official statements to disseminate lies and 
distortions.31 An important tool is the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), 
which specializes in the creation and dissemination of false information using social media.32 
The rise of social media has provided Russia with new tools to use against the West. Russia 
has consistently used ads designed to exacerbate racial tensions and related issues including 
police brutality, violence against police, white supremacy, and immigration.33 Simultaneous 
ads are used to fan mutual suspicion on both sides of issues.34 Another method used to pollute 
discourse is to support groups including fringe political parties, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO), think tanks, and environmental groups that cause unrest or problems for the target 
government or country.35 
The European Experience
Russia is attempting to weaken European public support for the European Union by both 
criticizing and undermining its ability to manage the pandemic.36 Before Russia’s malign 
influence campaigns are employed in the United States, they are frequently used against 
European allies and partners, particularly in the areas formerly occupied or controlled by the 
Soviet Union. Russia seeks to undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions in Europe 
and attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). According to diplomatic sources, 
Central and Eastern Europe is often a testing ground for disinformation tactics prior to their 
being used in Western Europe and the United States. The U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Georgette 
Mosbacher, stated that Poland is a testing ground for Russia and China to try out their 
campaigns using their trolls and bots.37 During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia shifted the focus 
of its propaganda efforts in Europe and elsewhere to SARS-CoV-2, spreading conspiracy theories 
about NATO, a major target of the its effort.38
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Troll: A person who intentionally initiates online conflict or offends other users to 
distract and sow divisions by posting inflammatory or off-topic posts in an online 
community or a social network; their goal is to provoke others into an emotional 
response and derail discussions. 
Bot: An automated social media account run by an algorithm, rather than a real person; 
it is designed to make posts without human intervention. 39
Figure 2: Trolls and Bots defined.
The Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM) stated that the pandemic has become an 
opportunity for China and Russia to conduct disinformation campaigns that include both overt 
and covert propaganda directed at the European Union (EU), NATO, and the United States.40 
According to PISM, Russia’s influence campaign related to COVID-19 is carried out by many 
entities including RT, for former Russia Today, Sputnik, the intelligence services, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, as well as trolls, bots, and fake accounts.41 The Russians 
draw on their experience in similar actions against Ukraine in 2013–2014,42 the United States 
2016 presidential campaign,43 French yellow vest protests in 2018,44 and Poland in 2019 and 
2020 related to historical Second World War issues.45  
The Russian campaign undermines the durability of American guarantees to Europe, seeking to 
damage or eventually break up NATO. In March 2020, Russia used fake news related to the U.S.-
led DEFENDER EUROPE 2020 international military exercises in an effort to convince the European 
public that American soldiers were responsible for the spread of the pandemic in Europe.46 It 
has sent medical assistance to some EU countries in order to gain their support in lifting EU 
sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its efforts to discredit Poland in the EU, referencing 
Poland’s alleged blockage of a Russian aircraft with medical assistance seeking passage to Italy, and 
interfering with the transport of face masks on the Polish border.47 Videos have been distributed 
through the Russian media in which Italians removed the EU flag from Italian city buildings, with 
the Russian national anthem resounding in the background.48 The goal was to damage unity in the 
EU and weaken Polish arguments on economic and political sanctions. In addition, Russian media 
publishes false information about the intentions of the Polish government stating that Poland 
would take the opportunity to annex the Kaliningrad Oblast exclave.49 
Both the United States and the European Union governments have recognized Russian 
disinformation campaigns directed against the Western democracies during the COVID-19 
pandemic. During a 2020 official briefing to the U.S. Department of State, Lea Gabrielle, the U.S. 
Special Envoy and coordinator of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), said 
that throughout the COVID-19 crisis, “… Russia[n] and Kremlin platforms were pushing out false 
narratives, those false narratives being repeated by other state actors, including Beijing, and then 
Russia re-tweeting them again and pushing them out as though they originally came from those 
state actors.”50 In early 2020, the Avast Security News Team51 reported that an internal document 
circulated among EU officials alleged that Russia launched a significant disinformation and 
malinformation campaign about COVID-19 in order to cause panic and worsen the impact of the 
outbreak on the European countries.52 The Russian malinformation campaign attracted worldwide 
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media attention with Reuters53, The Guardian54, and Deutsche Welle55, among others, reporting 
disinformation. The European External Action Service, the EU’s foreign policy arm, claimed Russia 
is continuing to pursue its goal to subvert European societies by pushing disinformation online 
in English, Spanish, German, and French regarding the virus in order to confuse and hinder the 
EU’s response to the pandemic.56 The campaign also includes malinformation and disinformation 
including the narrative that the virus is a U.S. biological weapon.57
A European Parliament study on disinformation and propaganda states that some of the 
Kremlin’s disinformation efforts target underprivileged communities abroad in order to 
feed on the frustration of these groups.58 Some argue that the economic crisis and resulting 
social inequalities and frustrations might potentially fuel violent extremism and home-grown 
terrorism; however, such correlation requires further study and analysis.59 One of the objectives 
of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy is to instigate riots and mass protests abroad.60 Russia is 
believed to back and finance, directly or indirectly, various, sometimes competing, protest 
groups in foreign countries, such as the Occupy movement.61 Russia interfered in the U.S. 
presidential elections, where Russian trolls posing as Americans made payments to genuine 
activists in the United States to help fund protest movements on socially divisive issues.62 It is 
believed that the Kremlin played a role in social media activity that amplified the “yellow vests” 
movement in France, leveraging the extant economic problems and helping the protests to 
become a more serious threat to the French government.63 According to the Central and Eastern 
European think-tank, the Visegrad Institute, the Russian agency RIA Novosti is already preparing 
narratives instigating socioeconomic fear and unrest in the West, by publishing disinformation 
narratives as media accounts alleging that Europe and the United States are preparing for 
hunger riots as an outcome of the pandemic.64 The potential for foreign actors to utilize the 
deepened financial disproportions as a tool to activate, support, or inflame social divide, unrest, 
or even conflict cannot be underestimated. 
Interference with the 2016 Election
The prolonged Russian effort to undermine democracy in the United States and the West 
reached a new level with the 2016 elections representing an escalation in focus, level, and 
scope.  According to the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russian 
objectives in attacking the 2016 elections were to undermine the legitimacy of U.S. democracy 
by eroding faith in the process and attack Hillary Clinton and her potential presidency.65 
Favorable outcomes of attacking Clinton included her losing the election; if she won, degrading 
legitimacy of her presidency; and intensifying U.S. social tensions.66 During the election 
campaign period, Russia developed a preference for Donald Trump as president but only as a 
tertiary consideration. The attacks on Clinton and her potential administration were specifically 
attacks on democratic legitimacy and conducted only against her after it looked like she would 
win. Russia’s campaign against the 2016 presidential election was a continuation of Soviet active 
measures to attack the United States and its allies.67  Contextually, the attacks were directed 
against the election process to further attacks against democratic legitimacy, the overarching 
Russian objective.
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During the 2016 presidential election, Russia used several issues to disrupt the political process 
and manipulate public opinion.  Their efforts often targeted stakeholders on both sides of an 
issue attacking, for example, both Black Lives Matters and white supremacy groups.68 Russian 
activities against the 2016 election used all of the major social media platforms to influence 
and interfere.69 Russia did note that a downside to their campaign against the election process 
existed if the U.S. Intelligence Community detected and reported on it. The Intelligence 
Community did, in fact, detect and report on it, however, the consequences were likely not at a 
level that concerned Russia. 70 
The Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), closely tied to Putin and the Kremlin, used social 
media including Facebook to organize rallies both supporting and opposing candidates in the 
election including nine instances cited in the Mueller Report.71 In Texas, the IRA organized both 
a protest and counter-protest in the same location and on the same date, encouraging both 
sides to fight in the streets.72  Immediately following the 2016 election, Russia used an IRA-
controlled group named BlackMattersUS to organize an anti-Trump rally in Manhattan that drew 
as many as 10,000 protesters including documentary filmmaker Michael Moore.73 At the time of 
this writing, Russia has already begun its activities against the 2020 election including targeting 
related to presumed presidential nominee Joseph Biden, promulgating counternarratives on 
meddling in the 2016 election, and attempting to incite white nationalist violence.74 The Russian 
Internet Research Agency (IRA) has tried to exploit a wide range of societal divides including 
racial and cultural divides against the United States. COVID-19 has created an environment 
conducive to the spread of inaccurate or deliberately false information intended to disrupt the 
election process.75
Vulnerabilities to Malign Influence Campaigns
America is experiencing growing polarization based on race, ideology, and culture because of 
demographic and cultural changes which gives rise to hostility against any opposing party and 
its leaders.76 When a society divides into mutually distrustful and polarized factions, democracy 
is endangered.77 Social groups and identity have always been part of American society and 
were previously a source of stability, however, many of the divisions have become aligned 
with political parties.78 The divides in U.S. society continue to widen, creating opportunities 
for adversaries. Since the 1960s, the United States has experienced polarizing conflict with the 
underlying divisions important factors in American politics.79 Americans increasingly dislike and 
distrust those aligned with the other political party.80
U.S. divisions that have been highlighted and may be exploitable during and after the COVID-19 
pandemic include racial differences, economic inequality, political parties and polarization, the 
urban/rural divide, and the digital divide. COVID-19 has afflicted Black Americans harder than 
whites with both higher infection rates and mortality.81 Wealthy individuals have better access 
to health care that is not available to the poor.82 The national conversation on SARS-CoV-2 has 
been divided largely along political lines with Democrats extremely concerned and Republicans 
generally not concerned.83 Differences in geographic infection rates between urban and rural areas 
have supported thinking that COVID-19 is someone else’s problem.84 As New York City’s COVID-19 
cases spiked in the early spring, wealthy residents often fled to second homes in surrounding rural 
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and resort communities to the consternation of permanent residents.85 Most Americans believe 
that the Internet has been essential during the pandemic; however, a digital divide exists with a 
less connected population challenged with completing everyday tasks including schoolwork.86 
Recent rallies have been held in California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and other states in favor 
of ending the shutdowns and reopening the United States. The rallies have often been cast in 
a political light with racial undertones and may have served to underscore societal divisions. 
In California, minority groups perceive recent protests in Sacramento, Orange County, and 
San Diego as displays of white privilege.87 Damage to the economy has resulted in significant 
pressure to reopen for business from Republican politicians and the media.88 In many of 
the state protests, concerns have been raised about carrying firearms at these protests, 
incorporating gun control, another divisive social issue.89 Numerous effects from the pandemic 
may be exploited for malign disinformation campaigns.
Weaponizing COVID-19
COVID-19 has created numerous opportunities for adversaries to weaponize its effects and 
attack the United States and its allies. COVID-19 anxieties have made people especially 
susceptible to disinformation and made the public more conspiracy-minded. Russia will 
certainly recognize the utility of conspiracy theories and malinformation about COVID-19. 
Numerous detrimental outcomes include undermining medical experts, announcements of fake 
COVID-19 cures, stressing financial markets, and advancing racism.90 The Russians are using the 
chaos and uncertainty that the virus created to attack the distribution of accurate information 
and to leverage existing societal divisions.91 Russia has used their state-backed English-language 
media outlets RT and Sputnik to disseminate politicized health news related to COVID-19 and 
characterize democracies as corrupt and incompetent.92 
Many of the effects of COVID-19 can be aligned with pre-existing controversies and could be 
exploited and weaponized by Russia. Numerous effects of the virus have been noted through 
the news media, policy discussions, and public discourse. For the purposes of weaponization, 
these effects have been categorized into three issue areas: economics, healthcare, and the 
social environment. The issue areas and effects may be the result of the virus itself, structural 
problems in society, or topics that have arisen in previous controversies. For the purposes of 
weaponization, the effects may be distorted to increase their ability to inflame societal divisions. 
Accuracy of a narrative is not essential, and this lack of veracity may even be desirable and may 
include both disinformation and malinformation. It may not be necessary to employ all the 
effects or even the issue areas themselves as the increasingly vociferous political discussions 
are sufficient to advance Russian objectives. Inaccurate news and information, lacking 
professionalism, often counterfeit, containing bias, and not credible was shared just as often on 
social media as reporting from traditional sources.93
Homeland Security Affairs | Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
10 COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns 
By Wesley R. Moy and Kacper Gradon
Figure 3: The weaponization of COVID-19.
Two hypothetical narratives were constructed as examples of COVID-19 being weaponized 
to exacerbate existing cleavages in the United States and Western societies.  The first draws 
on COVID-19 outcomes based on race and the second on socioeconomic differences. Both 
outcomes could be used to further existing conflict, however, similar outcomes could be drawn 
from both past and future crises to attack democratic legitimacy, interfere with democratic 
processes, and advance adversary’s objectives. While the model is used here to leverage 
COVID-19, there is likely utility for understanding the weaponization of other events such as 
natural disasters.
The response to the pandemic has become politicized at every level. COVID-19 has highlighted 
U.S. political differences with Democrats and Republicans experiencing related outcomes 
differently.94 In mid-April, a month into many of the U.S. lockdowns, COVID-19 has exposed 
inequities in society, creating both winners and losers with many divisions perceived to be along 
political lines.95 In early April, 77% of COVID-19 cases and 80% of deaths were in counties won 
by Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election.96 As of late-May, the pandemic was hitting Democratic 
states harder than Republican ones.97 In California, polling has suggested that conservatives are 
less supportive of measures to control the pandemic with this division perceived to be based 
largely along racial lines.98 COVID-19 has exacerbated the existing antipathy between polarized 
political factions leading to inaction and vulnerability to malign influence operations.99
There are numerous pre-existing divisions in American society that can be exacerbated using 
the effects of COVID-19 and the national response. Generational differences may be highlighted 
because of the economic stimulus package structure, increases in the national debt, proposed 
payroll tax reductions, and the declining health of the Social Security Trust Fund. The vaccination/
anti-vaccination debate will likely arise with the development of vaccines to be used against 
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COVID-19 as they are developed and rushed to distribution. Employment differences that may be 
exploited include designation of essential and non-essential workers; blue-collar and white-collar 
workers; insured and uninsured people for health and unemployment insurance; undocumented 
aliens; and the employed and unemployed. Additional divisions include urban populations against 
rural ones, progressives versus conservatives, and the coastal states against the flyover states. 
Closing of schools has highlighted the digital divide and has put inner city and rural children at risk 
of falling behind their peers. COVID-19 outcomes are fungible and can be used to attack many of 
the social divides.  The two scenarios to be explored were selected because they build on existing 
social movements identified with Black Lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street. Racial differences in 
COVID-19 experiences can be used to increase tensions against the 2020 election and beyond. It 
is important to remember the long-term Russian goal is undermining the democratic legitimacy 
of the United States and its Western allies.  Socioeconomic differences have also been highlighted 
by COVID-19 with different access to healthcare and employment alongside the ability to telework 
and designations as essential workers. 
Weaponizing COVID-19 
Against Racial Divides
Many of the differences that have resulted from COVID-19 are being defined by the media 
and others as race-related, mostly by looking at effects of the virus in the Black community.  
In the past, Russian-linked Facebook and Twitter accounts have attempted to increase racial 
tensions.100 During the 2016 election period, a fake Black Lives Matter group was able to garner 
more followers than Black Lives Matters itself.101 Thus far, there has been only limited discussion 
about other ethnic origins.  Many of the divides here can be associated with race but that may 
not be the whole story.
Russian use of race, disease, and a public health crisis to further its objectives harkens back 
to the Soviet use of AIDS in an active measures malign influence campaign against the United 
States.  Operation Infektion was initiated in 1983 by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti 
(KGB) and attributed the epidemic to U.S. Army research at Fort Detrick, Maryland that led to 
the development of AIDS as a biological weapon.102 Assisted by the East German Ministry for 
State Security (Stasi), the campaign lasted until 1987 when the United States refused to assist 
the Soviet Union with its own AIDS problem until the disinformation campaign was stopped.103 
Conspiracy theories around AIDS continued to circulate.  In 1997, a survey of African Americans 
found 29% believed it was true or possibly true that AIDS was manmade in order to infect Black 
people.104 Currently, in Russian media, the theory has appeared that SARS-CoV-2 virus was 
engineered in the United States in order to hamper China’s economic development.105 Russia 
has also echoed Chinese narratives that the virus was developed as a weapon against China and 
introduced to Wuhan by the United States.
COVID-19 is infecting and killing Black Americans at a disproportionate rate. Racial data on 
COVID-19 cases and deaths is not uniformly collected and reported, however, disproportionately 
Black counties account for half of U.S. cases and almost 60% of deaths.106 Black Americans have 
higher levels of underlying conditions and less access to healthcare, hold more jobs defined as 
Homeland Security Affairs | Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
12 COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns 
By Wesley R. Moy and Kacper Gradon
essential, and experience racial disparities in housing that increases their risks.107 In Michigan, 
Blacks are 14% of the population but 33% of cases and 40% of deaths while whites are 75% of 
the population and account for 25% of cases and 26% of deaths.108 The situation in Illinois is 
similar where Blacks are 16% of the state population but account for 30% of positive diagnoses. 
In Chicago, Blacks account for 70% of COVID-19 deaths.109 
A second racial division COVID-19 has highlighted is distinctions in employment, both prior 
to and after the onset of the pandemic. There have been record numbers of unemployment 
claims and the numbers, as a percentage of the unemployed have grown dramatically, raising 
memories of the Great Depression.  Differences based on race are significant. Since the onset of 
COVID-19, 16% of Blacks and 20% of Hispanic adults have reported being laid off in comparison 
with 11% of whites.110 Black Americans are more likely to hold jobs that were declared essential 
during the pandemic.111 Black workers and their families are more exposed and cannot stay at 
home to protect themselves. Nationally in the United States, they are 30% of all bus drivers and 
almost 20% of food service workers, janitors, and cashiers.112 
General environmental conditions can be weaponized. Compared with whites, Blacks are more 
likely to live in densely populated areas with a lack of food options, parks, recreation, lighting, 
and where safety is a constant concern.113 Through late May, there seems to be higher levels of 
infection associated with more densely populated areas.  Certainly, the more populated an area 
is the more cases there will be.  A better metric is likely to be the number of cases per 100,000 
reported as a ratio rather than the nominal numbers of those affected. Several sociologists have 
observed that the United States has historically “solved” social issues through segregation and 
boundaries, concentrating unhealthy conditions and other hazards into poor neighborhoods.114 
U.S. urban areas, where COVID-19 has been hitting the hardest, is where racial minorities, 
especially Black Americans, are typically concentrated.115 
Weaponizing COVID-19  
Against Economic divides
The second set of the societal divides that can be leveraged and exploited as a background 
for the disinformation campaigns during the pandemic are economic differences. Disparities 
aggravated by the unprecedented social crisis could be especially useful to create “Us versus 
Them” or “Have versus Have-Nots” narratives during the pandemic and its expected long-term 
aftermath. The socioeconomic divide deepened during the pandemic116 affecting the poorer 
sectors of society as COVID-19 spreads, creating a Pandemic-Inequality Feedback Loop.117 This 
loop is a situation where a health crisis hitting entire segments of society sets off a cycle in 
which declining economic status leads to rising rates of chronic illness. That chronic illness, 
in turn, further depresses productivity and raises health care costs, leading to more poverty, 
which leads to more disease.118 According to a Polish Academy of Sciences review, the pandemic 
may be a phenomenon that strengthens the social hierarchy, as people with higher social 
and economic status treat health-promoting behaviors as an investment and part of their life 
strategy, 119 with their financial situation and opportunities allowing them to avoid the activities 
requiring personal contact and exposure to higher risks of infection.
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Although Russian propaganda is primarily based on the dissemination of partial truths and 
outright fiction through multiple channels,120 the Kremlin’s disinformation strategies do not have 
to rely on completely fabricated claims and conspiracy theories. As Russia’s primary objective is 
to undermine democracy in the West by destabilizing institutions and polarizing societies,121 it 
is effective to utilize an existing crisis or disaster situation,122 such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to 
aggravate any discussion by exploiting the real problems and presenting them in such way that 
results in deepened divisions in the affected societies. 
There are in fact important distinctions between the situations of affluent and disadvantaged 
segments of society in regard to the COVID-19 emergency.123 They translate to different 
opportunities, prospects, and coping mechanisms with respect to the crisis and its immediate 
and long-term repercussions.124 For the purpose of explaining the socioeconomic divides, 
distinctions are grouped into four general categories: income, housing, healthcare, and 
nutrition. Each of them, either alone or in combination, can be weaponized and used in 
disinformation campaigns, using inflammatory narratives oriented towards sowing social 
discord and animosities amplified by the real and perceived threats connected to the COVID-19 
pandemic. It needs to be stressed that such socioeconomic differences have always existed in 
Western societies, but the extraordinary emergency resulting from the pandemic facilitates the 
intensification of grievances, benefiting the agenda of disinformation campaigns.125
Higher income levels are correlated with higher quality of education126, which decreases the 
risk of long-term unemployment. A wide range of personal and professional advantages and 
contacts due to education and subsequent work history increase potential options to be 
successful in finding replacement employment in case of losing a job.127 High-earners are more 
likely to have emergency funds, savings, and investments, allowing them to maintain economic 
security during the pandemic.128 Wealthier individuals are also less likely to suffer long-term 
consequences of a recession, which translates directly to psychological well-being and mental 
health.129 The more affluent families are likely to own multiple Internet-connected devices and 
the access to fast data transfer and connections making them better informed.130 Hence, they 
are unlikely to suffer from digital exclusion,131 but are more prone to be able to work and study 
remotely without any significant drop in productivity.132 
Wealthier members of society tend to live in larger houses located in better and more attractive 
areas.133 Larger housing, predominantly located in the suburbs, usually detached and with an 
access to gardens, parks, or recreation areas134 provides for much safer living conditions during a 
health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Wealthier areas support social distancing,135 
reducing the need to use shared common spaces, particularly likely to facilitate the infection 
rates such as hallways, staircases, or elevators.136 It also translates to more private space for 
its residents, supporting telecommuting137 and distance education.138 Larger housing and more 
private space is safer for mental health:139 lower depression levels, lower anxiety, and lower 
levels of frustration and aggression. More affluent families are also more likely to own “safe 
havens” such as a second house or vacation property140 allowing for the planning of a potential 
evacuation during a lock-down or emergency period. 
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More prosperous socioeconomic groups are more likely to have access to better health 
insurance and private plans. They also have better opportunities to access high quality 
telemedicine and access to reliable medical information allowing them to base their decision-
making on dependable and trusted, well-researched data and sources. Higher income levels 
also support faster access to reliable rapid testing for infection and antibodies and to receive a 
‘health clearance’ enhancing psychological wellbeing and supporting the return to daily routine. 
According to quantitative medical data, there is also a correlation between higher income level 
and better general health and level of physical fitness. These lifestyle opportunities and choices 
significantly reduce the threat of serious outcomes from potential COVID-19 infection. 
Wealthier persons are also likely to already have a balanced vitamin and mineral intake, which 
helps them to maintain a stronger immune system. In general, they do not have to rely on public 
transport and can avoid non-essential travel altogether or use private vehicles, significantly 
decreasing exposure to infection. More private living space also translates to the lower risk 
of added mental health consequences and stress related to the prolonged lock-down. Better 
education allows wealthier persons to be better informed and aware of various preventive 
strategies and coping methods, and more likely for this cohort to implement these strategies 
and methods in their daily routine. Finally, they can afford sourcing the Personal Protective 
Equipment, even at radically inflated prices.
Wealthier families have – in general - access to better quality food141 and are less likely to suffer 
from diseases related to poor diet.142 Better-off persons are more likely to have larger storage 
space and opportunities to stockpile food and other supplies.143 They are also more likely to 
have access to better quality grocery shopping including specialty shops, farmers’ markets, 
private shopping services, and grocery stores with wider aisles and shorter queues144 which also 
limits the risk of viral infection. Higher income classes are more likely to have access and means 
to afford fast home-delivery of high-quality, on-line grocery shopping and meals.145
Utilizing Weaponization Scenarios
There are numerous divisions existing that can be manipulated and leveraged malign influence 
campaigns. Any combination of economic or racial discrepancies aggravated by the COVID-19 
crisis outcomes can be used and distorted – on local, regional, national, and international levels. 
Disinformation operations would most likely employ all available social media platforms, used to 
disseminate fake news through the network of trolls and bots, most probably using and running 
accounts set up through the Virtual Private Network (VPN) servers consistent with the location 
of the attack sites. Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) is known to have utilized the VPN 
technology to conceal the origin of their disinformation campaigns, as illustrated by the IRA 
operations during the US presidential elections.146 The disinformation would then be broadcast 
further with the use of social media groups and individual profiles, thus getting momentum 
and allowing for the spread of disinformation beyond the group of original followers of specific 
accounts or user clusters. Such a strategy of using various platforms of networking sites and 
communication channels has proven effective, at least since the 2011 London Riots, where 
Blackberry Messenger notes, used for encrypted communication, were instantly amplified by 
Twitter and Facebook re-posts.147 
The probable focal points of disinformation and malinformation dissemination would be the 
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areas vulnerable to a specific type of division intensified by the pandemic or other events. 
Ethnically diverse towns and neighborhoods nationwide are susceptible to instigating the 
racial and socioeconomic unrest, as the scale of infection rates and the mortality toll is 
disproportionally higher for ethnic minorities, which – in the scope of disinformation campaigns 
– can be exploited. As seen in the case of the protests originating from the death of George 
Floyd, the original cause of the demonstrations can quickly metastasize into riots inflamed by 
the home-based activists and leaderless groups such as the Antifa – potentially exploitable by 
Russian media outlets such as RT, formerly Russia Today, and Sputnik News utilizing genuine 
grievances.148 The killing of Floyd was not linked in any way to the pandemic, but the general 
state of unrest and economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 crisis is likely to have played a 
role in the scale and scope of the disturbances that followed. RT instantly linked the COVID-19 
narrative with the death of Floyd, titling its May 30, 2020 editorial: “Riots in the COVID-19 era 
are the ‘language of the unheard,’ looted bare by white elite.”149 Amplifying the racial grievances 
and the economic situation of the disenfranchised population is the most likely disinformation 
scenario in both the near term and beyond. Due to the high number of options for the 
narratives oriented on racial divisions in the society, the instigators of disinformation have 
an exceptional opportunity of using numerous permutations of factors including healthcare, 
income, housing and nutrition to initiate disinformation and malinformation campaigns during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Travel hubs, cities with major international airports, and the proximate wealthier 
neighborhoods could be a target of blame for the narratives focused on “bringing the disease 
in.”150 The potential scenarios could involve rich businessmen and holiday-makers returning 
from resort destinations and infecting the service staff of the airport, taxi or Uber services, 
local shop-keepers, or other groups of essential workers. Utilizing the “holiday” storyline, 
foreign vacations are easy to exploit, instigating anger at irresponsible travelers jeopardizing 
the health and safety of the underprivileged populations in the United States. In a similar way, 
resort communities and fashionable retreats could be targeted using the context of wealthy city 
dwellers invading peaceful communities and bringing disease with them. The real or fabricated 
story of a previously healthy population exposed to the major health risk by “unwanted” visitors 
is likely to raise anger on a local level and then become replicated and calibrated to fit specific 
communities in a similar manner.151 
The largest cities with high density populations and high infection rates are especially prone to 
become the targets of disinformation and malinformation in the aftermath of COVID-19. The 
differences in the outcomes of infection distribution152 could be amplified and translated into 
scenarios showing an alleged genocidal conspiracy behind COVID-19. Such a scenario is illustrated 
by the disinformation campaigns described by the European Union East StratCom Task Force. One 
of the conspiracy theories used by the pro-Kremlin media is that COVID-19 is a tool which “the 
elite circles use to reduce the excessive number of useless eaters to a smaller and more docile 
cohort of helot-like servants.”153  Disinformation could be based on real situations and media 
accounts, such as narratives about take-out food delivery drivers congregating in highly infected 
areas in order to bring expensive products to their rich customers.154 Scenarios of disinformation 
could be based on fabricated accounts from grieving families who supported their loved ones 
taking up dangerous and unnecessary tasks and then dying from the disease. 
The Us versus Them narrative can take several forms – from the moderately benign to the 
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most extreme. As in the case of the leveraging the racial divisions in the society to run the 
disinformation campaigns, the socioeconomic differences are also easily exploitable and offer the 
significant number of “primers”, whose combination can be utilized to run fake news campaigns. 
Conclusions
Russia is likely to use effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as part of its ongoing campaign to 
undermine Western democratic legitimacy. Active measures campaigns will continue to utilize 
all types of influence activities. Efforts to counter this influence need to consider troll activities 
from the Internet Research Agency as well as the reporting from Kremlin-aligned news media 
outlets such as RT and Sputnik. Russia may try to co-opt the efforts of groups legitimately raising 
social problems and inequalities with the intent not to address issues but to use the groups’ 
efforts to continue to undermine society. We are likely to see new active measures techniques 
used against Eastern European countries. The continuation of narratives against racial and 
socioeconomic divides are probable as COVID-19 feeds a whole of society approach to conflict 
termed “hybrid warfare” by Western observers. 
COVID-19 feeds the Pandemic-Inequality Feedback Loop, which further exacerbates societal 
divides. This has widened racial and socioeconomic divides, supporting potential Russian use 
of narratives on racial differences as they did during the 2016 election campaigns. Russia may 
take advantage of new areas of difference such as wealth inequality, access to testing and 
healthcare, essential workers, unemployment, telework, and even vacation homes. 
We should also expect that weaponized effects can be injected into multiple simultaneous 
crises such as we saw in late-May 2020 with the ongoing pandemic,155 the economic 
downturn related to the pandemic,156 racial tensions from police shootings,157 and the Central 
Park dog leash incident.158 Effects from other crises such as natural disasters may also have 
the potential to be weaponized, such as the suffering in the Lower Ninth Ward following 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.159
Protecting civil rights and civil liberties is often considered to be in opposition to countering 
malign influence. In fact, the exact opposite is likely true. Occupy Wall Street co-founder Micah 
White is concerned about movements such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter being 
co-opted by entities, such as the Internet Research Agency, and diverted from their original 
organizational mission to supporting Russian interests.160 This could potentially lessen the 
legitimacy of these and other social movements if it is understood that Russian trolls may be 
behind at least some aspect of them. 
Recommendations
The attention focused on the U.S. election process needs to be shifted to include the 
overarching Russian objective of undermining the legitimacy of Western democracy. Activities 
against the election process and candidates are part of a larger campaign. Efforts around the 
2016 election directed against Hillary Clinton were intended to undermine the legitimacy of her 
potential administration when it seemed that she would win the election. The reasons for the 
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Russian preference for Donald Trump were not disclosed by the U.S. Intelligence Community.161 
Malign influence needs to be thought about in a larger context than the election cycle and 
considered in the context of the overarching Russian objective of undermining the legitimacy of 
democratic government.162
Eastern European countries, especially those that were part of the former Warsaw Pact and 
Soviet Union, are often the first to be the target of a Russian active measures campaign. 
Increased engagement with them could yield numerous potential benefits. Early looks at 
new Russian malign influence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) would provide early 
warning before the campaigns were used against Western Europe and the United States. Having 
expertise on the ground would assist these countries to identify and potentially counter the 
measures being used against them. There are numerous federal agencies and departments that 
have the potential to play a role in reporting malign influence TTPs. 
Establishment of an academic center or institute could create an additional venue for 
information exchange, particularly if attention is paid to establishing international relationships 
with the Eastern European countries that first see new Russian influence tactics. We 
recommend the initiation of a designated research center that would cooperate closely with 
affiliated academic partners in the former Warsaw Pact countries, which are most heavily 
affected by the Russian disinformation campaigns including Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia 
and Poland. The Subject Matter Experts and practitioners representing government institutions 
and intelligence services of all countries involved should assist this transatlantic alliance 
of scholars specializing in the domain of Russian influence and disinformation operations. 
What would make such a research center unique is the opportunity to study the Russian 
disinformation in real time and in the actual field of malign operations. The experience and 
observations gained would then be calibrated to the specificity of the U.S. situation and 
tested in the war-gaming exercises. Such approach would allow for the creation of the pro-
active, plausible and empirically based strategies for prevention, mitigation and interdiction of 
information warfare in the United States. 
U.S. federal engagement with state and local partners is strong in many areas and defending 
against Russian and other adversaries' malign influence activities is another area in which all 
partners bring unique capabilities to the table. State and local communities are the first to see 
political movements and are potentially able to detect foreign influence through engagement 
with those movements and protect their i ntegrity. The federal government can engage with 
foreign governments such as those in Eastern Europe and detect Russian activities that might be 
used against local interests and movements. 
Interagency and international exercises could potentially provide a venue to develop linkages for 
information sharing related to malign foreign influence. An initial step could be exercising this 
sharing among U.S. federal, state, and local partners. Local law enforcement, for example, may 
be the first to detect such attacks as the election interference, outreach to right-wing extremist 
groups,163 or interfering with the redress of racial divides.164 Inclusion of other stakeholders 
would likely increase the value of exercise outcomes.
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Significant benefits would likely be realized through engaging international partners alongside 
stakeholders from state and local government, academia, and the private sector. With Russian 
use of former Warsaw Pact countries as initial targets of information campaign, exercises would 
enable early sharing of information between them. Advance warning would also be provided to 
the United States, Western European allies, and Asian partners of the likely Russian tactics that 
could be used against them. Academic research can bring a fresh perspective to a problem and 
is less subject to the daily pressures placed on government organizations. Finally, the private 
sector is often the target of malicious online attacks and can bring different resources to bear 
including the ability to develop new security products and bring them to market.
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